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The Struggle for Korea, 1876–1882
In February 1876, the so-called Kanghwa Treaty imposed by the Japanese on 
Korea had forced the Koreans to abandon their traditional policy of seclusi-
on. However, vast majority of the Koreans considered it an unnecessary and 
humiliating step, and wished to prevent not only any Japanese encroa-
chment, but, in fact, any Japanese activity in Korea. From the traditional 
Korean point of view, the Japanese were considered inferior and less civili-
zed people, whose obedience of Confucian rites and knowledge of classical 
Chinese culture was much insuffi  cient. In fact, since 1644, when the Man-
chu dynasty conquered Beijing, the Koreans considered themselves the real 
custodians of Chinese culture. The Koreans especially disliked the Japanese 
since 1590s, when Hideyoshi invaded Korea and caused enormous harm to 
the country. On the other hand, even traditional Koreans didn’t wish to en-
tirely abolish relationship with Japan and were content with time-honoured 
forms of relations with Japan. 
Japan wasn’t the only country which was interfering into the Ko-
rean matters. The Middle Kingdom was suzerain of Korea. The Chinese con-
sidered Korea their vassal country, whereas the Japanese claimed that Korea 
was fully independent. Several other countries, like the United States, Rus-
sia, and the United Kingdom, were interested in Korea as well. None of these 
countries had such a strong position in Korea in the period of 1876–1882 
that it could dominate at the peninsula. In fact, these years were the last 
years when the Koreans were fully able to rule themselves, although not 
much well. 
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son, by a poisoned ginseng, as well as of planning an elimination of Kojong.7 
But it didn’t seem that he could dominate Korean politics again. 
Japan had a vital interest on Korea from many points of view. Ko-
rea was a “dagger pointed at the heart of Japan”,8 and an occupation of its 
territory by a foreign power would pose a mortal threat to the Japanese. It is 
uncertain when the Japanese of the Meiji period started seriously to plan to 
annex or subdue Korea (unrealistic plans of discontent politicians not taken 
into account). The Japanese defi nitely wouldn’t allow to turn Korea into an 
enemy base, as far as they had enough power to prevent it. As Count Inoue 
Kaoru, infl uential statesman of the Meiji period, who had concluded the 
Kanghwa Treaty, explained to progressive Korean patriot Kim Ok-kyun in 
early 1880s: “Our armament programmes are not solely for our own defence, 
but also aim to assist your country to achieve full independence.”9 Japan 
wouldn’t accept establishment of unfriendly regime in Korea. And they 
would welcome Korean self-strengthening, because it was the best way to 
prevent falling of Korea into hands of potential enemies of Japan. At this 
period, Japanese statesmen had fresh experience with thorough reforms of 
Japanese society, thus they had good reasons to believe that the Koreans 
were able to modernize their country, though slower. In 1870s, Japan expe-
rienced several uprisings of former leaders of the Meiji Restoration, who 
were discontent with the overall course of the reforms and especially with 
“weak” policy towards Korea. But the last and worst of them, Saigō 
Takamori’s uprising in Satsuma, was crushed in 1877, and since then mode-
rate attitude of Japanese government in Korea hadn’t been questioned. 
Today, we know that the Korean reforms failed. Korea was smaller 
than Japan and was in much worse geopolitical position. Traditional Korean 
fi nancial system wasn’t reformed and was unable to provide means for fi -
nancing the reforms.10 Furthermore, in contrast to Tokugawa Japan, Korea 
didn’t have even limited contacts with the modern world, therefore was ab-
solutely unaware of Western knowledge and culture. From my point of view, 
7)  S. C. M. PAINE, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Perceptions, Power, and Primacy, Cam-
bridge 2003, pp. 39–40. 
8)  This phrase was for the fi rst time used by German advisor K. J. von Meckel, who was in the 
second half of 1880s an advisor to Japanese General Staff . 
9)  Quoted in: Jerome CH’EN, Yuan Shih-k’ai, 1859–1916. Brutus Assumes the Purple, Stanford 
(Calif.) 1961, p. 22. 
10)  DEUCHLER, p. 106. 
The last Korean king Kojong,1 who became the king at the age of 
eleven in 1863 and assumed power in 1874, was a tragic person. In his late 
years he was a mere puppet of foreign powers, and he had shown lack of will 
to power. However, in the fi rst phase of his rule, he was both willing and able 
to support moderate modernization of the country.2 In 1875, he severely pu-
nished the most reactionary offi  cials who were preventing reaching any 
agreement with Japan. Later, Kojong reformed Korean government and he 
chose its offi  cials on his own will, not taking into account whether or not 
they were members of some infl uential faction.3 
Despite the fact that Kojong was generally able to control state mat-
ters, Korean politics was dominated by two clashing factions. King’s father 
Tae’wongun4 was a strong reactionary, fully dedicated to Confucian views.5 
He was a mortal enemy of the powerful family of Min, whose most powerful 
member was Kojong’s wife, Queen Min. In 1875, Tae’wongun had probably 
assassinated an important member of the Min clan (and his own brother-in-
law) by a bomb, and attempted to kill the queen in the same manner.6 He was 
even suspected of poisoning Queen Min’s fi rst son, therefore his own grand-
1)  In 1864, Kojong was chosen the successor of King Chol’ jong (died 1863). He abdicated in 
1907 and was succeeded by his son Sunjong, but in 1905 he proclaimed himself emperor, 
therefore he was the last Korean king. 
2)  „Some historians insist that Kojong was a fl exible, pragmatic, bold, and innovative reformer, 
at least in the late 1870s and 1880s. Others describe him as a weak, confused, secretive, and 
intrigue-minded ruler. Realistically, the negative description seems more valid for the period 
after 1895... Earlier... he was indeed a pragmatic, fl exible an innovative reformer – probably 
not as much as his counterpart in Japan, Emperor Meiji, but more than Empress Dowager Tz’u-
hsi of China.” Yur-Bok LEE, Wayne PATTERSON, One Hundred Years of Korean-American Rela-
tions, 1882–1982, Mobile 1986, p. 44.
3)  Martina DEUCHLER, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys. The Opening of Korea, 
1875–1885, Seattle and London 1977, pp. 11–13. 
4)  His personal name was Yi Ha-ŭng, but he is generally known under his title „Tae’wongun“, 
which means „Prince-Regent“. He was born in the same generation as Chol’ jong, therefore 
he couldn’t succeed him instead of Kojong, because accordingly to Confucian views the 
new ruler should be one generation younger than his predecessor. 
5)  Despite this fact, he was unscrupulous enough to collaborate with the Japanese in 1890s, 
whenever it seemed opportune for him. 
6)  DEUCHLER, op. cit., note 13. on p. 236. 
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was a vital source of grain and raw materials for Japanese factories.12 Japane-
se statesmen did their best to interest Japanese merchants in trade with Ko-
rea. In August 1876, a merchant named Ōkura Kihachirō, persuaded by Ōkubo 
Toshimichi, arrived to Pusan and sold his wares profi tably, composed mainly 
from foreign-made textile. Later, the Japanese government decided not to rai-
se any duties on trade among Japan and Korea.13 Although the Kanghwa Trea-
ty was signed, it was necessary to implement its stipulations relating to regu-
lations of trade, opening of ports, and residence of Japanese settlers in Korea, 
as well as to establish Japanese legation in the Korean capital.14 
Korea had to send an envoy to Japan in return. King Kojong ap-
pointed a traditional Confucian scholar Kim Ki-su. Between May 22 and 
June 28, 1876, Kim was abroad. He showed no interest in the Japanese facto-
ries and other modern facilities; after his return, this disappointed Kojong, 
who hoped to be informed about Japanese modernization. Kim with asto-
nishment observed the infl uence of foreigners in the Japanese treaty ports, 
and he didn’t understand economic changes in Japan.15 
On July 30, 1876, Japanese negotiator Miyamoto Koichi arrived to 
Seoul to fulfi ll goals of Japanese government. On August 24, 1876, he conclu-
ded a supplementary treaty and trade regulations, which allowed Japanese 
settlers to move in a range of 10 Korean ri (2.5 miles) around treaty ports.16 It 
further stipulated that Japan would care of repatriation of any foreigners who 
would wreck on Korean coast.17 The Korean government strongly opposed per-
manent residence of Japanese envoys in Seoul. The treaty furthermore didn’t 
open any new ports to Korean trade, partly due to lack of knowledge of the 
Japanese authorities about the most opportune places. The task of opening 
12)  Between 1877 and 1882, Japanese companies imported from Korea goods worth of circa 
¥5,,104,859. The most important of these goods was rice (circa ¥1,,529,636), followed by gold 
(¥972,242), leather (¥829,131), soya beans (¥557,057) and other products. See Ibid., p. 459. 
13)  DEUCHLER, p. 71. 
14)  Japanese government didn’t expect immediate success at the last point, and was prepared 
to accept an establishment of temporal legation at Inchon or Kanghwa. See CONROY, p. 89. 
15)  DEUCHLER, pp. 51–53. 
16)  For Miyamoto’s mission, see CONROY, pp. 87–89, and DEUCHLER, pp. 54–56. 
17)  Tyler DENNETT, Americans in Eastern Asia. A Critical Study of Foreign Policy of the United 
States in the Far East in the Nineteenth Century, New York 1963, p. 455. 
even more important is that, unlike Japan in the Tokugawa period, Korea 
wasn’t divided into many principalities. Some of Japanese principalities 
have fi nally challenged the Tokugawa regime, and the side, which had better 
adopted modern methods and weapons, had won. There was no internal war 
in Korea, and contesting factions at the court were using only traditional 
methods of assassination. There was no opportunity to settle the quarrel 
between Korean traditionalists and progressive leaders (if there were any) by 
an open and total war, which would have aff ected entire Korean society. The-
se faction struggles inside the Korean court were preventing any consensus. 
On the other hand, Japanese government after the Meiji Restoration, alt-
hough dominated by several clans which supported the restoration, was able 
to maintain homogenous views. Those dignitaries who opposed general 
course of the reforms or of foreign policy have been excluded from the go-
vernment, and thereafter they were unable to prevent the modernization of 
Japan by making obstructions inside the government. If they openly resor-
ted to arms, they were totally eliminated, because the government was stron-
ger. As a result, Japanese government was able to promote reforms despite 
any public disaff ection. 
Next to “strategic anxiety”, another motive for Japanese engagement 
in Korea was the enormous humiliation of Japan by unequal treaties with the 
Western countries, and Japan wanted to enhance her prestige by reaching si-
milar superior position in Korea. Although prestigious reasons were impor-
tant, economic matters were crucial. At this time, developing Japanese indu-
stry defi nitely didn’t need to sell its products at Korean markets, because 
Japanese factories weren’t producing high quantities of goods yet. However, 
the Japanese companies were profi tably re-exporting Western-made goods to 
Korea, and this profi t was contributing to their further growth.11 And Korea 
11)  Between 1877 and 1882, the Japanese exported to Korea goods worth of ¥4,,603,337. Ja-
pan-made products were worth of ¥537,846. Among these, the most important was ironi-
cally a raw material – copper – worth of ¥197,909. Among re-exported, Western-made go-
ods, which was worth of ¥4,,065,591, was by far the most important shirting (¥2,,305,990), 
followed by cotton cloth (¥296,937) and dyes (¥180,889). See Hilary CONROY, The Japanese 
Seizure of Korea, 1876–1910. A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations. 
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1960 p. 458. 
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Seoul again in order to demand compensations for Japanese merchants, and 
continued negotiating about opening of Korean ports. He succeeded in nego-
tiating the opening of Wonsan instead of Mun’chŏn. The treaty was conclu-
ded on August 30, and the port had to be opened until May 1, 1880. Hanabu-
sa further pushed forward an opening of Inchon, but Korean government 
expected strong public resistance in case Inchon were opened, and refused 
the idea at least nine times, so even Hanabusa’ second visit, which was termi-
nated on September 3, 1879, wasn’t entirely successful.24 
Kojong’s position towards China was ambivalent. Kojong wanted 
to strengthen Korea and didn’t wish an enhancement of Chinese infl uence 
in the country; however, he didn’t deny or dare to deny Chinese suzerainty 
over Korea.25 As long as Chinese grip over Korea wasn’t strong, he inclined to 
accept Chinese help in modernization of his country. Li Hongzhang, Viceroy 
of the metropolitan province of Zhili, who was enormously infl uencing Chi-
nese foreign policy, was afraid of Russian and Japanese designs,26 and wished 
to strengthen Korea. Today it seems strange, but China at the turn of 1870s 
and 1880s looked like a relatively successfully modernizing country. There-
fore since 1879 Kojong tried to send Korean students and artisans to China 
in order to educate them in modern methods. Despite Chinese goodwill to-
wards this project, it was extremely delayed.27 More important result of in-
tercourse with the Chinese was Kojong’s faith in the United States. 
Since 1879, Li Hongzhang was recommending that Kojong should 
conclude treaties with Western powers in order to strengthen Korean positi-
on towards Russia and Japan. For some time, the Koreans were yet inclined 
not to deal with the foreigners. Their enmity towards Christianity was shown 
again in 1878, when Korean authorities arrested some French missionaries, 
24) For the second Hanabusa’s mission, see DEUCHLER, pp. 59–61, and CONROY, pp. 96–97.
25)  In the Chinese eyes, Korea was “a dependent state of China, yet free and responsible in the 
management of both its domestic and foreign aff airs.” CONROY, p. 110. This position “was 
not only confusing, but, in fact, incompatible with the modern system of international law 
and relations.” LEE, PATTERSON (eds.), p. 16. 
26)  At this time, Russia seemed much worse adversary of China, for it since the Moslem rebel-
lion occupied large Chinese territories in Eastern Turkestan and the Chinese were afraid 
that this clash may result in a war. The Japanese, although they occupied and annexed the 
kingdom of Ryūkyū, which was Chinese vassal, were much less feared by the Chinese. The 
gradual annexation of Ryūkyū, however, undermined Korean faith in Chinese might.
27) DEUCHLER, pp. 92–93 and 99–100. 
Korean ports was entrusted to Hanabusa Yoshimoto,18 who had negotiated in 
vain with the Koreans already in 1872. Since October 1877, Hanabusa under-
took a surveying mission on board of a steamer Takōmaru.19 He was surveying 
southern and western coast of Korea up to Inchon. He found local Korean au-
thorities extremely uncooperative: “The captain of the Takōmaru asked about 
the geography of the area. They said they knew nothing.”20 
On November 25, 1877, Hanabusa entered Seoul. He showed Japa-
nese friendliness by off ering foodstuff s of Japanese rice for Korea, which 
was struck by famine, but the Koreans refused.21 Hanabusa tried to negotia-
te the opening of Mun’chŏn at the eastern coast of Korea, but the Koreans 
refused under the pretext that there were sacred tombs of Korean kings.22 
Finally, he was able to reach an agreement that coal may be temporarily de-
posited in the vicinity at the Mun’chŏn Bay in order to facilitate further sur-
veying of Eastern coast of Korea. When he was leaving Seoul, knowing that 
he will return, he left part of his luggage in the city in order to establish 
a precedent for permanent settlement of Japanese emissaries. However, the 
Koreans continued their play and with great eff ort they brought it to him 
when his ship was about to leave Korea.23 
In late 1878, the Koreans started further obstructions, when local 
offi  cials at Pusan taxed trade with Japan. Hanabusa landed in the vicinity of 
the city, accompanied by Japanese marines, whose presence impressed the 
Koreans enough to rescind the duties. On June 13, 1879, Hanabusa visited 
18)  CONROY, p. 84 states that his personal name was Yoshimoto, whereas DEUCHLER, p. 57 
claims that his name was Hanabusa Yoshitada.
19)  CONROY, p. 86 calls this ship Takōmaru; DEUCHLER, 58 states that this ship was called 
Takaomaru.
20) CONROY, p. 90. 
21) Ibid., p. 91.
22)  In 1868, an American named Jenkins tried to violate tombs of Korean kings at the island of 
Kanghwa in order to acquire sacred treasures, which he aimed to return to Korea in exchan-
ge for conclusion of a Korean-American treaty. He was unsuccessful, but after his return to 
Shanghai he wasn’t punished due to lack of evidence. See Hosea Ballou MORSE, The Interna-
tional Relations of the Chinese Empire. Volume III., The Period of Subjection, 1894-1911, Lon-
don, Bombay, Calcutta 1918, p. 3. Hanabusa in vain suggested that presence of Japanese set-
tlers in Mun Chon would prevent any such violation of the aforementioned tombs, because 
these Japanese would be trustworthy for the foreigners. See CONROY, pp. 92–93.
23) For the fi rst Hanabusa’s mission, see DEUCHLER, pp. 58–59, and CONROY, pp. 89–95. 
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the United States maintained friendly relations with Japan. Earlier, the Ja-
panese had promised to Korea not to transmit letters of any foreign govern-
ment. They wished a treaty between Korea and the United States, but they 
did nothing which would irritate the Koreans, thus slow Hanabusa’s negot-
iations with Korea. Of course, they didn’t wish worsening the relations with 
the United States as well. Ironically, while the Chinese since 1879 recommen-
ded conclusion of treaties between Korea and the Westerners, the Japanese 
suggested the Koreans the same as a tool against the Chinese infl uence. When 
Shufeldt appeared at Pusan on May 4, 1880, he asked a Japanese consul for 
mediation, but the Koreans didn’t accept this attempt. Thereafter the Ameri-
cans persuaded the Japanese to enclose Shufeldt’s letter in a letter by the Ja-
panese government to the Koreans. Unfortunately, the Koreans returned the 
American letter unopened, because the enclosure was addressed to the Ko-
rean King instead to the Department of Rites33 and Korea was called “Koryŏ” 
instead of “Chosŏn.”34 When replying to the Japanese, the Korean govern-
ment wrote literally: “It is well known to the world that our foreign relations 
are only with Japan, neighbouring to us, which have been maintained since 
three hundred years, and that other foreign nations are not only situated far 
from us, but there has never been any intercourse with them.”35 
Shufeldt’s unopened letter was returned by the second mission to 
Japan, which was led by Kim Hong-jip. This mission had an enormous eff ect 
on the Korean reforms. Inoue Kaoru advised Kim: “The American motive is 
nothing but friendly foreign trade. Your persistence in isolation is bad. It will 
invite unexpected harm. Therefore accept the American off er.”36 But this was 
with no eff ect. A treatment by the Chinese diplomat in Tōkyō, Huang Zunxi-
an was much more important. The treatment was called “A Policy for Korea” 
and recommended negotiating with the United States and warned of Russi-
an danger. Kojong was apprehensive of these advices.37 The Koreans trusted 
the Chinese more than the Japanese, and in October 1880, members of the 
Korean court serious quarrelled about reforms. Their main supporter sud-
denly became Yi Ch’oe-ŭng, Täwongun’s elder brother, who, however, wasn’t 
33) Accordingly to Chinese custom, this offi  ce was in charge of Korean foreign relations. 
34)  For the fi rst phase of Shufeldt’s mission, see DENNETT, pp. 455–457, and DEUCHLER, pp. 
110–112.
35) Quoted in DENNETT, p. 457. 
36) Confi dential documents of Japanese Foreign Offi  ce, quoted in CONROY, p. 100.
37) LEE, PATTERSON (eds.), pp. 13–14; DEUCHLER, pp. 90–92. 
which were released next year due to intervention from Beijing.28 But since 
the conclusion of the Kanghwa Treaty it seemed that the Korean government 
could be fi nally persuaded to conclude some treaty. In 1878, the Koreans at 
the island of Cheju have treated well British castaways, and young British 
diplomat (later Sir) Ernest Satow considered it a good pretext to visit Korea 
personally. He landed at Cheju, local offi  cials treated him well, but they re-
fused to accept any letter.29 However, in 1880, ships of Western powers ap-
peared at Korean shores, though not coordinated – in April, the Russians, in 
May, the Americans, in June, French ships, and in August, the Italians.30 In 
the summer of 1880, Italian minister to Japan suggested joint naval demon-
stration of the powers in order to open Korea to foreign trade. Due to insigni-
fi cance of Korean trade, the British refused to participate, and the plan 
didn’t come into eff ect.31 All this eff ort was unsuccessful, as well as visits of 
Russian riders, who crossed the rover of Tumen and tried in vain to present 
the Koreans letters by Russian authorities.32 
The United States wasn’t much interested in Korea from economic 
point of view, but its government wished to improve position of American 
sailors in case they shipwrecked at Korean shores. From the Christian point 
of view there was an opportunity to baptize the Koreans. The United King-
dom wasn’t much interested in Korean trade, which was considered of low 
importance. Much more important were strategic considerations. The Bri-
tish were afraid of Russian ambitions in Korea, and were decided not to al-
low any Russian gain at the peninsula. As far as the Russians weren’t using 
Korean bases, the British didn’t much care who rules in Korea. Russia, on the 
other hand, planned to acquire at least ice-free naval bases at the Korean 
peninsula. Other Western countries didn’t have real interest in Korea. 
Among these foreigners, by far the Americans led by Commodore 
Shufeldt were the most important. Since late 1878, he undertook a great 
voyage around the world, and the American government empowered him to 
conclude a treaty with Korea. In early 1880, the Americans asked for Japane-
se mediation. It was quite logical, because in the second half of 19th century, 
28) MORSE, p. 9.
29) DEUCHLER, pp. 109–110. 
30)  Peter DUUS, The Abacus and the Sword. The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910, Ber-
keley, Los Angeles, London 1998, p. 50. 
31) DEUCHLER, p. 123. 
32) Ibid., p. 126. 
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cy and without knowledge of the government as such.43 And, of course, Korea 
fi nally purchased no Japanese ships. 
As well in Tokugawa Japan, some men of rare qualities were able to 
understand full meaning of the Japanese reforms. As well as the Japanese 
twenty years ago, some Koreans wanted to secretly visit some foreign coun-
tries, ironically Japan. Hanabusa was confronted with the Koreans, who as-
ked him secretly to smuggle them from Korea.44 In 1881, Kojong decided to 
send the third offi  cial, though secret, mission to Japan. Among twelve senior 
offi  cials, who took part on it, were such prospective leaders as Hong Yŏng-sik 
and Ŏ Yun-jung. Between May and August, 1881, the so-called “Gentlemen 
Mission” was thoroughly observing Japanese progress, and after they return 
they reported to Kojong.45 Whereas most of the members of the “Gentlemen 
Mission” were sensitive of Japanese ambitions, some of their junior atten-
dants, like Kim Ok-kyun and Sŏ Kwang-bŏm (both later became leaders of the 
progressive movement), liked Japan and soon thereafter returned there. 
Although some individuals became convinced to support the re-
forms, in Korea there was no class capable of developing the country in the 
same direction as Japan. Popular masses were extremely reactionary and 
weren’t interested in any reforms. Confucian scholars despised all non-Chi-
nese infl uences, whereas Korean merchant class unlike their Japanese col-
leagues were totally insignifi cant.46 The Chinese mainstream statesmen of 
the late Qing period usually thought that Confucian regime as such was 
splendid and that China just needed to adopt western technologies, such as 
modern weapons, but that Western culture and political forms were useless. 
Korean traditionalists were much more obscurantist. They didn’t under-
stand causes of defeats of Korean troops by expeditionary forces of Western 
countries prior to the Kanghwa Treaty (in fact, many of them considered 
these clashes victorious for Korea), and they didn’t have use even for modern 
weapons.47 The opposition of Confucian scholars resulted in an anti-reform 
43)  Ibid., pp. 97–98. However, the Imo mutiny of 1882 delayed this step, and Inchon had to be 
opened only on January 1, 1883. See DEUCHLER, p. 64. 
44) CONROY, op. cit., p. 97.
45) DEUCHLER, pp. 101–02.; CONROY, p. 98, DUUS, pp. 52–53.
46)  Carter J., ECKERT, The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 
1876–1945, Seattle, London 1991, p. 8.
47)  For one leader of the reactionary movement, „the essence of victory and success lay in the 
right use of the soldiers and not in technology.” DEUCHLER, p. 104.
close to ex-regent, because he was jealous of him, and became aligned with 
the Mins. The reform movement temporarily prevailed. 
When Kim Hong-jip arrived in Tōkyō, he suggested that the third 
Hanabusa’s missions to Korea should be postponed, because the Korean go-
vernment was extremely annoyed by the suggestion to open Inchon. There-
fore Hanabusa waited until mid-December, 1880. The Chinese warning bore 
an unexpected fruit, when the Koreans fi nally gave up. Kojong personally 
gave Hanabusa an audience, and on January 4, 1881, Hanabusa started ne-
gotiating with the Koreans again. Finally they gave up and in February 1881, 
Korea promised to open that port within September 1882.38 Even more im-
portant was the fact that Hanabusa was present in Seoul permanently. He 
set up Japanese legation outside the city walls. 
In January 1881, Kojong reorganized the Korean government and 
established so-called T’ongnigimu Amun, Offi  ce for the Management of State 
Aff airs (later reorganized in January 1882). It was directing a wide range of 
functions, foreign relations as well as military aff airs, industry and educati-
on. Although the Mins were holding important posts in this offi  ce, they were 
far from controlling it entirely.39 King Kojong was aware that armoured clas-
hes with foreign navies were always defeats of Korea, and wanted to reform 
not only military offi  ces, but also the military itself. In 1880, Li Hongzhang 
recommended in vain that several thousand Korean troops should be trai-
ned at Tianjin.40 In May 1881, military attaché of Japanese legation, Lieute-
nant Horimoto Reizō, was put in charge of training of some Korean soldiers 
instead.41 The training fi eld of this unit, which was called pyŏlgigun, had to 
be surrounded by a fence, because soldiers from traditional Korean units 
were observing and laughing their drill.42 In 1881, reform-minded offi  cials 
of the Korean government secretly visited Hanabusa and even suggested that 
Korea would like to buy ships from Japan, but they were acting in top secre-
38)  For the third phase of Hanabusa’s negotiations relating to opening of Korean ports, see 
DEUCHLER, pp. 62–64 and CONROY, p. 97.
39) DEUCHLER, pp. 92–98.
40) Ibid., p. 103. 
41)  Ibid., p. 103 claims that Horimoto started training the Koreans in May 1881, whereas 
DENNETT, p. 467 states that this happened only in 1882. 
42) CONROY, pp. 98–99.
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asked the then American Secretary of State for instructions, which he, howe-
ver, never received. Finally he agreed upon a compromise that Kojong would 
after signing of the treaty write a personal letter to the American president, 
reassuring that Korea was a vassal state of China. The fi nal version was 
agreed upon in Baojingfu and in May, Shufeldt, accompanied by the Chinese 
naval offi  cials Ma Qianzhong52 and Ding Ruzhang, arrived in Korea. On May 
22, 1882, the United States and Korea was concluded without any obstruc-
tion the co-called Shufeldt Convention.53 Kojong had sent to the American 
president a letter which claimed that “Korea is a dependency of China, but 
the management of her government aff airs, home and foreign, has always 
been vested in the sovereign.” On the contrary to Li Hongzhang’s wish, this 
letter was dated prior to the conclusion of the treaty. The American State 
Department maintained the position that Korea was in fact independent.54 
On June 6, the British succeeded in concluding treaty with Korea containing 
the same stipulations, and the same was achieved by the Germans on June 
30. Kojong again declared Korean dependency on China.55 
Since the conclusion of the treaty, King Kojong was extremely fri-
endly towards the United States. He thought that the Americans, who had no 
colonies and were far from Korea, have no aggressive designs on mind.56 This 
was absolutely right, but this also meant that they weren’t much interested 
in Korea at all. Nevertheless, Kojong relied on American help and gradually 
he became persuaded that the Americans were “elder brothers” of Korea, 
while Washington was unaware of this fact. 
Thus, in 188257 Korea entered into treaty relations with several 
powerful nations. Nevertheless, Japanese interest in Korea was by far in-
comparable to the interest of any foreign country. The amount of trade 
between Korea and Japan was steadily growing. Whereas in 1871, Korea 
exports to Japan totalled ¥52,382 and imports from Japan totalled ¥59,664, 
in 1879 these amounts were ¥677,061 and ¥566,953 respectively, and in 
52)  Ma was furthermore a respected scholar and actively participated on negotiating the Ko-
rean-American treaty.
53)  For the genesis of the Shufeldt Convention, see DENNETT, pp. 457–462, and DEUCHLER, 
pp. 114–122. 
54) CONROY, pp. 110–111.
55) DEUCHLER, pp. 124–125.
56) LEE, PATTERSON (eds.), p. 14.
57) DUUS, p. 50 erroneously states that these treaties have been concluded already in 1881. 
movement in 1881. Confucian scholars were sending memorials and petiti-
ons and demanded punishment of reform-minded offi  cials. An execution of 
one the main dissidents didn’t solve this problem. Even Tae’wongun’s illegi-
timate son tried to overthrow and replace the king, but he was betrayed and 
forced to commit suicide.48 Despite this opposition, Kojong fi nally decided to 
conclude a treaty with the United States. 
Japanese role in the fi rst phase of Korean-American negotiations 
disappointed Shufeldt.49 Li Hongzhang off ered him good services of Chinese 
government, but Shufeldt had to refuse, because he was instructed to rely on 
Japanese mediation. However, in late August, 1880, he visited Tianjin and 
was impressed by Li Hongzhang, who even (perhaps not earnest) suggested 
that Shufeldt could one day hold an important position in the Chinese na-
vy.50 Thereafter Shufeldt returned to the United States, only to return direct-
ly to Tianjin in June 1881. Since early 1881, Li and Shufeldt started negotia-
ting about stipulations of the prospective unequal treaty, although no offi  cial 
representative of the Korean government was present. Many of Li 
Hongzhang’s suggestions were advantageous for the Koreans: import duties 
had to be 10 % (30 % in case of luxuries), export duties at 3 %,51 import of 
opium and missionary activities had to be forbidden, extraterritoriality for 
foreigners had to be only temporal. However, Li had on mind acknowledg-
ment of Korean position as a dependent country of China. Shufeldt opposed, 
48) Ibid., pp. 104–106. 
49)  There is no consensus whether or not the Japanese wished opening of Korea to the forei-
gners. DENNETT, p. 457 claims that in 1880 “it was reasonably clear to Shufeldt that Japan 
was actuated by no earnest desire to have the trade of Korea thrown open to the world, and 
that the Japanese were manipulating the negotiations to serve their purposes.” Each gover-
nment of course manipulates everything to serve its purposes. DEUCHLER, p. 110 writes 
that the Japanese “in their talks with Western representatives... tended to downgrade the 
value of Korean market. Toward the end of the 1870s, Japan became increasingly apprehen-
sive of Russian designs and hesitantly began soliciting Western contacts with Korea... Politi-
cal advantage seemed at this point to outweigh the possibility of commercial loss.” CONROY, 
p. 100 claims that “The evidence would seem to add up to Japan’s having made a genuine 
eff ort to obtain a treaty. That she did not do more may have been due to... (the fact that) Japan 
had promised Korea not to transmit letters of other nations to her offi  cials.”
50) DENNETT, pp. 458 and 462. 
51)  Ibid., p. 459 gives number 3 %, whereas DEUCHLER, p. 121 states that in the fi nal version 
of the treaty, export duties were fi xed at 5 %.
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while Queen Min escaped the palace unharmed.62 But among the victims 
were both Min Kyŏm-ho and Yi Ch’oe-ŭng, Tae’wongun’s own elder brother. 
Simultaneously the rebels switched their anger on the Japanese. 
On July 23,63 Lieutenant Horimoto was killed at barracks of pyŏlgigun, and 
the same fate faced also several other Japanese who were outside their lega-
tion. The insurgents destroyed the barracks and even destroyed captured 
modern weapons. Mutinous soldiers attacked also the legation building; 
members of Hanabusa’s staff  were bravely defending, thwarted their attack 
and waited on help of loyal governmental troops, then hoped to hide in 
Seoul, but in late evening, Hanabusa realized the vanity of this hope and he 
decided to fl ee to Inchon. On July 24, Japanese fugitives reached the city, 
where they were attacked again, and took shelter on a boat. Thereafter they 
were found by British frigate Flying Fish, which was sent to survey Korean 
littoral waters, in fact to impress the Koreans. Its crew had realized that the 
Koreans, instead of being impressed by the foreigners, are killing them.64 
The frigate saved the Japanese, who on her board left Korea for Nagasaki. 
For a short time, Tae’wongun controlled Korea again. His eldest 
son became commander of the insurgents.65 King Kojong had to return 
Tae’wongun to power. T’ongnigimu Amun was abolished, Korean reform mo-
vement was halted. But reactionary forces were unable to “save” Korea from 
modern world; in fact, they invited foreign armies to Korea instead. 
On July 30, Hanabusa’s report about the incident reached Tokyo. 
The fi rst reaction of Japanese government was extremely conciliatory. At 
a special governmental meeting it was remarked that “this kind of aff air is 
typical of the time of opening up diplomatic relations in Eastern countries, so 
62) CONROY, p. 101.
63)  CONROY, pp. 101–102 states that both royal palace and Japanese legation were attacked 
on July 23, and that the palace was attacked fi rst, whereas MORSE, op. cit., p. 10 state that 
the insurgents attacked Japanese legation on July 23 and the palace only the day after, 
i.e. on July 24.
64)  In Seoul and Inchon, altogether 12 or 13 Japanese subjects were killed, and their souls are 
enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tōkyō.
65)  CONROY, p. 102 quotes Japanese scholar Tabohashi: “An attack on the Japanese legation... 
was planned and led by the eldest adopted (! – J.K.) son of the Taewongun, who hoped... to 
gain an important position,” whereas DEUCHLER, p. 134 claims that they were “under 
command of Tae’wŏngun’s eldest son, Yi Chae-myŏn.” Curiously, Yi Chae-myŏn already had 
been minister of punishment. See Ibid., p. 98. 
1881, Korea exported to Japan goods worth of ¥1,,882,657 and imported 
stuff  worth of ¥1,,944,731.58 From Japanese, as well as from Kojong’s, point 
of view, everything went well. Korea started military reforms, reformed its 
government, and the king established diplomatic relations with a Western 
country. Since 1881, several tens of Koreans started studying in Japan, and 
in January 1882, about seventy Korean students and artisans fi nally star-
ted studying at Tianjin.59 Generally, it seemed that Kojong’s moderate re-
forms were successful. However, the events of 1882 marked the end of this 
phase of Korean reforms. 
Similarly to the Chinese, superstitious Koreans were persuaded 
that natural catastrophes were results of bad governmental policy. Serious 
drought in 1882, which had resulted into prospects of bad harvest, was con-
sidered a supernatural punishment for conclusion of the Korean-American 
treaty.60 In July 1882, the so-called Imo mutiny broke out, and it had horrib-
ly aff ected Korean position towards the outside world. The Imo mutiny was 
caused by negligence of maintenance of traditional Korean troops. These 
soldiers hated especially military reforms, which were threatening existence 
of their units, and their wages hadn’t been paid for a long time. It was due to 
extreme corruption of Korean offi  cials. In mid-July, soldiers of one old-fa-
shioned regiment have realized that their rice-rations were of poor quality 
and mixed with sand, and they rebelled. Nephew of the queen, Min Kyŏm-ho, 
who was responsible for distribution of rice, arrogantly ignored their de-
mands, so they attacked him, and he barely escaped. 
At that time, discontent members of the army were already plot-
ting in order to return Tae’wongun to power and to abolish reforms, and 
king’s father was much popular among the soldiers. On July 23, he openly 
became leader of the insurgents,61 appointed his son their commander, and 
ordered them to attack mansions of his political enemies, above all the Mins, 
as well as the royal palace. His opponents, both Mins and others, were ruth-
lessly massacred. For some time it was generally believed that even Queen 
Min either poisoned herself or was poisoned on Tae’wongun’s order, but in 
fact, her female servant sacrifi ced herself and pretended to be the queen, 
58)  CONROY, op. cit., p. 457. 
59) DEUCHLER, pp. 100–101.
60) CONROY, op. cit., p. 101. 
61)  At that time, some 30,000 Korean soldiers were dislocated at the area of Seoul. Only some 
10,000 of them joined the insurrection, but they were reinforced by many common people. 
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A group of Korean offi  cials who were abroad asked for Chinese 
help. They were motivated both by natural fear from Japanese retaliation 
and by desire to dispose of reactionary clique.71 Viceroy Li Hongzhang was 
accordingly to traditional custom mourning for one year in temporal retire-
ment, because his mother had died. But he didn’t fail to recommend imme-
diate armoured action. Deputy Viceroy Zhang Shusheng sent three warships 
and one brigade72 of the Huai Army, which was created by Li Hongzhang and 
was the best Chinese military unit. On August 10, 1882, Chinese warships 
appeared in front of Inchon. At that time, Hanabusa, accompanied by one 
battalion of Japanese troops, was returning to the peninsula. On August 12, 
he landed at Inchon and proceeded to Seoul. He reached Korean capital on 
August 16, on August 20 he negotiated with Kojong and Tae’wongun, presen-
ted Japanese demands,73 but in vain, and three days later he “violently an-
gry” left Seoul for Inchon. Meanwhile, on August 20, several thousand Chine-
se troops from Shandong landed in Masampo. Naval commanders Ding 
Ruzhang and Ma Qianzhong, as well as General Wu Zhangqing and his sub-
ordinate Yuan Shikai, advanced on Seoul, secretly resolute to crush the re-
bels by force. Although their troops were numerically weak, they had a signi-
fi cant advantage over Korean insurgents, who lacked discipline, fi rm 
leadership, as well as modern training.74 
The main obstacle to the Chinese plans was Tae’wongun. On Au-
gust 25, Ma, Ding, and Wu visited him in his residence and were impressed 
71)  They were led by Ŏ Yun-jung, who thereafter cooperated with the Japanese, and was killed 
in 1896 as a Japanese puppet.
72)  Diff erent authors give diff erent numbers of Chinese soldiers. CH’EN, p. 18 gives the fi gure 
of 3,000 troops, whereas DEUCHLER, p. 133 states that “With an advance force of two thou-
sand men, Wu arrived at Masampo on August 20.” CONROY, p. 104 claims that “Three to 
four thousand (Chinese – J.K.) troops poured in.” DEUCHLER, p. 138 states that “After the 
1882 incident, three thousand Chinese soldiers were stationed in and around Seoul.” MY-
UNG, p. 67 states that Chinese forces totalled 5,000 men.
73) For these demands, see DEUCHLER, pp. 135–136.
74)  Although Chinese troops in Korea were among the best soldiers China had at that time, 
even their behaviour was poor, they were plundering, and Yuan Shikai ordered to execute 
several of them in order to discipline them. See CH’EN, pp. 18–19.
the incident should be given sympathetic consideration.”66 It was absolutely 
right.67 Hanabusa had to return to Inchon with a Japanese battalion,68 but 
he had to act peacefully. If you think there is need to open fi re, request in-
structions, was he told at meeting with Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru.69 This 
failure to pursue an aggressive policy in such a case of fatal violation of in-
ternational law is a proof that Japan didn’t intend to attack Korea at this 
time. Japanese peaceful attitude wasn’t caused by fear from clash with the 
Chinese, because at that time the Chinese haven’t reacted yet. 
Chinese overlords of Korea undertook a more aggressive stance. It 
was in accordance with temporal relief of the Qing government in 1880s. 
Rebels were defeated, the self-strengthening movement seemed to be eff ecti-
ve, and boundary disputes with Russia in Chinese Turkestan resulted in re-
covery of part of territories occupied by Russia. The Manchu dynasty started 
expanding modern fl eet, and several years later, China even dared to ask 
Russia for retrocession of the Possieta Bay, which was surrendered to Russia 
in 1860; the reason was that the Chinese wanted to build a naval base at the 
Japan Sea.70 Shortly, Chinese leaders started to feel false self-confi dence. 
66) CONROY, p. 102.
67)  In 1862, such prospective prominent statesmen as Itō Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru and other 
members of the Chōshū clan attacked and burned British legation in Edo. See Iwao (ed.) 
SEIICHI, Biographical Dictionary of Japanese History, Tokyo, New York (N. Y.) 1978, pp. 
251, 351 and 361. In contrary, Marius B. (ed.) JANSEN, The Cambridge History of Japan. 
Volume 5, The Nineteenth Century, Cambridge 1989, p. 333 claims that this attack took 
place in 1863 and that British legation had been attacked for the fi rst time in 1861. In 
1863, other attackers burned also American legation in Edo. See DENNETT, p. 398. As far 
as China is concerned, let’s mention just the Tianjin Massacre of 1870. 
68)  CONROY, p. 110 claims that Hanabusa’s escort consisted of 800 Japanese soldiers, whereas 
Hyun-Cho MYUNG, Korea and the Major Powers. An Analysis of Power Structures in East 
Asia, Seoul 1989, p. 67 states that there were 1,500 Japanese. DUUS, op. cit., p. 67 states 
that the Japanese planned to send to Korea a Mixed brigade (some 8,000 soldiers), but 
then gave up this plan because of quick Chinese reaction. But it doesn’t seem that Japane-
se government had such aggressive scheme on mind, because in case the Japanese were 
willing to send more troops to Korea, they had enough time to do that.
69) CONROY, p. 103.
70)  Andrew MALOZEMOFF, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881–1904. With Special Emphasis on 
the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1958, p. 23.
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were allowed to travel in much wider range; and a new treaty port Yanghwa-
jin had to be opened. 
Not only the Chinese were Korean suzerain; they started to counter-
weight the Japanese infl uence in other respects. The attempt to educate Ko-
rean students and artisans at Tianjin was a disaster, because they were suff e-
ring so many obstacles that they were fi nally forced to return home. As 
a consequence of the Imo mutiny, a pathetic attempt to establish an arsenal or 
other modern facility in Korea was for some time thwarted as well. But, in-
stead of the Japanese, Yuan Shikai started training Korean troops, and whe-
reas the Japanese were training fourteen cadets, seventy Korean cadets de-
parted to Tianjin. The Chinese were prepared to strengthen their position in 
Korea, and this indeed happened in the next ten years. However, in the long-
term development, corrupt Qing regime was unable to utilize these gains. 
The events of 1882 forced the Japanese to compare Japanese might 
with the might of China. At this time, China was still a formidable opponent 
to Japan. Its newly built Beiyang Squadron, protecting North China coast, 
was as strong as the entire Japanese fl eet. Already in 1882, a member of Wu 
Zhangqing’s staff  recommended an annexation of Korea,80 another Chinese 
offi  cial, other Chinese offi  cial Zhang Beilun recommended war with Japan. 
Li Hongzhang was more cautious, as usually.81 Foreign residents at the Far 
East were expecting that a war between China and Japan was likely, and 
that the Chinese would win.82 Even the Japanese military leaders realized 
that Japanese might didn’t suffi  ce to guarantee victory in case of war, thus 
they started to plan strengthening of Japanese armoured forces. Whereas in 
1880 military expenses had amounted 19% of Japanese national budget, in 
1886 they had risen to 25% and in 1890, to 31%. Both army and navy have 
enormously grown. The state of the Japanese military had improved so much 
80)  It was not an isolated madness. In 1886, Yuan Shikai, then Chinese General Resident in 
Korea, allegedly wished to convince foreign representatives that Russia plans to replace 
China as Korean suzerain. Thus he probably wanted to gain consent of the powers to “take 
possession of the king, queen, and crown prince and deport them to China, placing the Tai-
wen-Kun again in power. Thus it was hoped to accomplish the next step in the annexation of 
the peninsula.” See DENNETT, op. cit., p. 483.
81)  DEUCHLER, pp. 138–140; Zhang’s and Li’s memorandums from late 1882 are quoted in The 
Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi. Ed. by A. M. POOLEY, Basingstoke 2002, pp. 311–
322 (Appendix A).
82) DENNETT, footnote on p. 468.
by his refi ned knowledge of Chinese culture. On the next day,75 the Korean 
leader was invited to the Chinese camp, where he was captured, escorted to 
Masampo, and on board of Chinese warship Dengyinzhou sent to Tianjin. He 
was held captive in China for more than two years.76 The capture of 
Tae’wongun struck the morale of the insurgents, and the majority of them 
fl ed. The remaining rebel soldiers were handily defeated by Chinese troops 
led by Yuan Shikai, and some of the captives were executed. In contrary to 
Confucian sacred principle of fi lial piety, Kojong rewarded the Chinese who 
have captured his father and deported him to China.77 
While these events happened in Seoul, the Koreans started negot-
iating with Hanabusa at Inchon. The Chinese commanders tried to under-
mine Japanese claim that Korea was an independent country and off ered to 
the Japanese their mediation, but Hanabusa resolutely refused. Since Au-
gust 28 he negotiated with the Koreans aboard Japanese warship Hiei, and 
soon thereafter the Treaty of Chemulp’o plus an additional convention were 
signed.78 They stipulated swift punishment of culprits;79 funeral of the Japa-
nese victims; ¥50,000 indemnity for families of these victims; ¥500,000 in-
demnity for the Japanese government; stationing of one battalion of legation 
guards at the Japanese legation; Korean mission had to be sent to Japan in 
order to apologize for the Imo mutiny; the Japanese representatives were 
granted unrestricted travel in Korea; other Japanese subjects in treaty ports 
75)  DEUCHLER, p. 133 claims that Tae’wongun was captured on August 26, when he “repaid 
Ma’s visit of the previous day.” CONROY, p. 104 claims that he was captured on August 25, 
whereas CH’EN, p. 19 claims that Chinese troops reached Seoul on August 25, the day after 
they visited Tae’wongun, invited him to their camp, kidnapped him, and that they rea-
ched Masampo on August 27. 
76)  DUUS, p. 54 states that Tae’wongun was held captive in Tianjin, whereas MORSE, p. 10 
claim that he was deported to Baojingfu, the capital of Zhili. The Chinese treated him well 
and considered him useful puppet in case of necessity, and they released him in 1885, 
when they felt the necessity to counterweight Japanese infl uence.
77) DEUCHLER, pp. 133–134.
78)  CONROY, p. 105 claims that the treaty was signed on September 3, whereas DEUCHLER, p. 
137 states that this treaty was concluded already in the evening of August 30. Of course, 
both scholars list its stipulations. 
79)  CONROY, p. 105 states that they had to be punished within fi fteen days, but DEUCHLER, 
p. 137 states that this had to be done within twenty days.
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that the Japanese gradually started feeling they could defeat China. From 
this point of view, temporal victory of Chinese policy in 1882 had caused an 
enormous defeat.83
Thus, the events of the summer of 1882 were a tactical victory for 
the Chinese, who strengthened their position in Korea, and a strategic victo-
ry for Japan, which was motivated to enhance her military preparedness. 
For the Koreans it was undoubtedly a grave defeat, because both of their Asi-
an neighbours have realized weakness of Korean reform eff orts, as well as 
growing interest of their opponent. Both China and Japan have stationed 
their soldiers on Korean soil, and the growth of their rivalry forced them to 
interfere into the Korean matters much more intensively than before. Before 
July 1882 Kojong was able to direct the course of the matters, but after the 
Imo mutiny he couldn’t feel safe. The position of the Mins was shaken as 
well. Despite bloodshed among members of the clan, the Mins remained an 
important faction. But whereas prior to July 1882 they were generally re-
form-minded, since that time they owed their return to power to Chinese 
intervention, thus became allies of Chinese representatives. This caused 
deep enmity between them and fanatic reformers, which were admiring Ja-
panese progress and relied on Japan’s assistance. Without this unnecessary 
struggle, the advance of Korea might have continued even despite Sino-Japa-
nese tensions, but the clash between Korean factions gave to China and Ja-
pan the best pretext to infringe into Korean internal matters. And even wor-
se things had to come. 
83) DUUS, pp. 60–65.
Revival of British Liberal Party 
1902–1905
PETER SKOKAN
In the general election in January 1906, the British Liberal party defeated 
the Unionists distinctively. The Liberals gained 397 seats and were suppor-
ted by 29 Labour MPs and 82 Irish Nationalists. The Unionists shrunk to 
a minority of only 156, whereas they won in the previous general election as 
many as 402 seats. The considerable shift in composition of the Commons 
indicates that a signifi cant change, both in political practice of parties and 
in popular perception of politics, occurred. The shift is more evident from 
a fact that the Liberal Party was in a deep crisis since 1886 and the revival 
itself took place only in last four years after the end of the Boer War. I suppo-
se, it could be said, that the change related to two basic phenomenons. A slow 
and painful exchange of generations in the Liberal party since 1880s was 
the fi rst; the second was a slow reintegration of the Liberal Party, which was 
arising from an absence of theme that could alienated various frictions 
amongst the Liberals and from opposition to proposed solutions to domestic 
reforms of the Unionists.
Generation exchange
Since the mid-1880s, the Liberal party faced a deep crisis that was caused by 
a stubborn endeavour of its leaders to solve the Irish question at any cost. It led 
to a split in 1886, which weakened the Liberals strongly. However, it cannot be 
claimed that the party lost considerable number of popular votes, because 
Francis Schnadhorst´s activities in the National Liberal Federation prevented 
